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ON HISTORICAL CONTEXTUALISATION: SOME CRITICAL  
SOCIO-LEGAL REFLECTIONS 
Lorie Charlesworth1 
School of Law  




This article examines the relationship of historico-legal studies to the wider context of 
socio-legal studies. It issues a challenge to rethink the nature and role of legal history 
in the light of socio-legal theory and the extent to which it out to be used by legal 
scholars. The discussion explores the benefits to socio-legal studies of 
interdisciplinarity. It suggests that historical reconstructions that contextualise the law 
should be properly acknowledged as a subgenre at least of the socio-legal 
movement, not simply perceived as an add-on methodology.  
 




The current state of socio-legal research and publishing in Britain at first glance 
raises doubts as to whether institutionally oriented forms of legal history, including 
specifically multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary variants, belong inside, at the 
margins of, or entirely outside the parameters of current definitions of socio-legal 
research. However, a closer examination reveals a different picture. In this context, 
this article reflects upon socio-legal historical reconstructions of law‟s pervasiveness 
and this writer‟s own perceptions of current trends and developments in legal history, 
both within and without socio-legal reconstructions. It will offer both examples and 
suggestions for future developments. 
 
It must be noted however, that within the disciplines of professional history and 
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criminology (and other related social sciences) there is an increasing awareness of 
how far it is necessary to consider the implications of the law for social conduct and 
belief, particularly in studies which depend (either explicitly or implicitly) on the 
development and operation of criminal law.2 Many researchers engaged in 
reconstructing law‟s past, either historians or criminologists essentially, have been 
influenced by the work of E.P. Thompson. They have, consequently, followed and 
developed his approach to „history from below‟, taking account of the reactions of 
„ordinary‟ people or the general public to the impositions of authority including the 
criminal justice process.3 As a result, this has produced an extensive body of work 
which touches upon „law‟ without actually entering into the issues important to 
lawyers. Although this writer acknowledges their significance and influence and 
accepts that such scholarship should not be excluded or marginalized, that work 
does not form part of this study: it is a challenge aimed primarily at lawyers, though 
the implications for other subjects looking to be informed by law are clear.  
 
As such, the chief purpose of this article is specifically to examine socio-legal 
historical reconstructions fashioned by „legal‟ scholarship and to reflect upon the 
issues generated by that examination. In order to answer some of the questions thus 
raised, it is also necessary to critically evaluate the research produced within the 
establishment sub-discipline of black letter legal history (of which more below).4 In 
summary, this article extends Smith and McLaren‟s fulsome and reflective 
historiography of legal histories.5 To this must be added Stramignoni‟s article in Legal 
Studies, which includes a narrow historiography of legal history as a chronological 
narrative description.6 As such, his characterisation of legal history is itself a meta-
narrative, which overviews the past and current status of legal historical writing that he 
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describes as „institutional legal history‟. Stramignoni calls for a history of the „blotted out‟ 
which includes, amongst others, the poor.  In order to achieve this end, he looks to a 
different strand of the sub-disciplines of socio-legal scholarship for a solution, proposing 
an investigation of the „other‟. Unfortunately, his perspective excludes mention of 
current or past research on those „blotted out‟ produced in both socio-legal and „pure‟ 
historical reconstructions. 
 
In contrast with Stramignoni‟s perspective, this article suggests that the historical 
reconstructions that contextualise „law‟ within socio-legal studies are an on going and 
developing project that requires specific focused examination. Many engaged in that 
project inherently recognise that law‟s emergence; development and transformation 
over time must not be ignored through a „parochialism of the present‟. Thus it 
appears timely to review the current situation and consider if socio-legal historical 
reconstructions may not of themselves constitute at the very least a sub genre of the 
socio-legal movement, rather than simply an „add on‟ methodology to be used as part 
of the law in action programme. At this point, it would be useful to provide a definition 
of what constitutes that sub-discipline of socio-legal studies. Unfortunately this fluid, 
changing, open movement defies such a fixed descriptor, as its membership 
depends upon types of activity carried out by those who identify themselves as 
contributors to this movement, and whose work is published in book series and 
academic journals that specialise and promote its application to different areas of 
law. Phil Thomas has summed up a key belief that underpins the commitment to 
socio-legal studies as a fully-fledged „law in context‟ approach in his claim that:  
„Empirically, law is a component part of the wider social and political 
structure, is inextricably related to it in an infinite variety of ways, and 
can therefore only be properly understood if studied in that context.‟7  
 
The focus and promotion of the movement in the UK is found in the membership and 
purposes of the Socio-Legal Studies Association (SLSA); „dedicated to improving the 
quality of and facilities for socio-legal research.‟8 In the past the SLSA has 
recognised three strands to its constituent scholarship; higher-level social theories of 
law disconnected from empirical studies, theories developed in the middle-range that 
                                                 
7
 Philip Thomas, „Curriculum Development in Legal Studies‟ Law Teacher  1986, 20,  pp.110; 112. 
8
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provide bursaries for SLSA student members. We host a series of one-day conferences / workshops on 
particular topics. We respond to consultation exercises on behalf of our members.‟ 
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are „grounded‟ in the findings of empirical research (and which, in turn, aim to prompt 
further empirical studies to test the validity of their theoretical claims); and, thirdly, 
policy-driven projects that are entirely empirical and have little explicit relationship 
with prior or current theoretical reflections: 
What binds the socio-legal community is an approach to the study of 
legal phenomena which is multi or inter-disciplinary in its approach. 
Our theoretical perspectives and methodologies are informed by 
research undertaken in many other disciplines. Traditionally socio-
legal scholars have bridged the divide between law and sociology, 
social policy, and economics. But there is increasing interest in law 
and disciplines within the field of humanities.9 
 
It is noteworthy that, historical reconstructions are not privileged within this definition 
and as discussed below, it appears that much of law‟s history within this movement 
has appeared as introductory chapters to works concerned with contemporary legal 
issues. Thus, it has largely been left to professional historians to mine those records 
generated by the operation of law to recreate the lived experience of the past. This 
lends support to the idea that such contextualisations do not necessarily belong 
within socio-legal studies. Furthermore, this raises the question, why then should 
those legal academics interested in applying an interdisciplinary analysis of the 
historical context of the emergence, development and change of „law in context‟ 
identify - in a positive way - with the socio-legal movement within the UK? 
Alternatively, should such individuals consider their research as belonging more 
closely to the mainstream of the discipline of history, or even perhaps as contributing 
to the somewhat legalistic and antiquarian sub-discipline of legal history, which 
historically has been notoriously fixated upon the feudal period?10 Such a narrow 
perspective as this has not remained unchallenged. For example Horwitz has 
referred to the unhistorical orthodoxy of black letter scholarship: 
It is history that comes to challenge this approach by showing that the 
rationalising principles of mainstream scholarship are historically 
contingent. Consequently, analytical scholarship is anti-historical: it 
regards history as subversive because it exposes the rationalising 
enterprise.11 
 
It is also of note, that currently Canadian and American scholars of legal history take 
a broader contextual view than is the case of the British establishment. In summary, 
                                                 
9
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10
 Smith and McLaren‟s survey concluded that: „the bedrock of English legal history scholarship over the 
first six or seven decades of the twentieth century was medievalist:‟ K.J. M. Smith and J.P. S. McLaren, 
„History‟s Living Legacy: an outline of'modern'historiography of the common law‟, Legal Studies, 21(2), 
2001, 251-324, p. 267. 
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 Morton J. Horwitz, „The Historical Contingency of the Role of History‟, Yale Law Journal, 90, (1981), p. 
1057. 
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their project is to consider both law‟s past and „law mindedness‟ both within the lived 
experience, including the geographical context, of settlers and native populations 
(where possible), in order to contextualise that research to reflect both continuity, 
discontinuity and the: „pervasive elements in North American legal culture‟.12 
Furthermore, some of this research has adopted a socio-legal methodology in 
considering the contemporary lessons to be learnt from such studies.13 Hutchinson, 
writing from Canada in Legal Studies, has extended the critique of the narrowness of 
some legal scholarship to the study of jurisprudence which privileges black letter 
lawyers‟ efforts to understand law in its own terms as: „a viable internal 
operation…entitled to theoretical priority‟.14 Thus, Hutchinson views „black-letterism‟ 
as a „convenient mode of denial‟ of law‟s „historical circumstances‟ allowing its 
practitioners to concentrate upon the logical; „and when it does see the expedient it 
seeks to avert its eyes or obliterate it.‟15 His critique supports what this socio-legal 
historian has come to understand as the basis of her work; the rejection of that 
internal legal „logic‟ with its continuing dominance of much legal study which ignores:  
The connections between legal doctrine and material interests [that] 
are often as causal and contingent as they are necessary, it is not that 
legal doctrine is without any rhythm or reason at all, but that any 
efforts to go beyond either the most general or the most detailed 
account are confounded by the doctrinal and social facts.16 
    
In short, in response to these and other influences, this article reflects upon a series 
of questions, issues and problems arising from the place and status of historical 
contextualisation within the British socio-legal movement. It addresses the question 
of what, to date, has been the main role and contribution of historical investigation 
within this movement, including research presented at annual SLSA conferences? 
Does the imperative of the socio-legal studies movement to reinterpret legal topics in 
a distinctly „law in context‟ manner, potentially include, and maybe even require, a 
distinctly historical form of contextualisation? Even if this question can be answered 
in the affirmative, does it follow that the commitment of socio-legal studies to a 
distinctly interdisciplinary analysis of law as a social phenomenon rule out the type of 
analysis found within institutional legal history? 
 
                                                 
12
 H. Foster and J. McLaren, „Law for the Elephant, Law for the Beaver. Tracking the Beasts‟, in J. 
Mclaren, H. Foster and C. Orloff (eds), Law for the Elephant, Law for the Beaver, (Ninth Judicial Circuit 
Historical Society, California, 1992), p.2. 
13
 See for example: David R. Percy, „Water Law of the Canadian West: influences from the Western 
States‟, in McLaren et al (eds) Law for the Elephant. 
14
 Allan C. Hutchinson, „Casaubon‟s ghosts: the haunting of legal scholarship‟, Legal Studies, 21(1) 
(2001), 65-98, p.72  
15
 Ibid., pp.85-6.  
16
 Ibid. 
Crimes and Misdemeanours 1/1 (2007) ISSN 1754-0445 
 
 6  
The article opens by discussing a series of arguments exploring the compatibility of 
historical contextualisation with the main tenets of the socio-legal movement. These 
arguments are supplemented by an empirical study of some of the relevant literature 
produced, largely but not exclusively, within the UK. This is a necessary task to 
substantiate this writer‟s analysis although she is also aware of the dangers of 
descending entirely into what Reid characterises as; „that most wretched of all 
historiological exercises, the survey of current literature‟.17 On the contrary, this 
survey serves to illustrate the presence of various types of historical analysis within a 
number of the core areas addressed by the British socio-legal studies movement and 
assesses their overall contributions to these fields. The final section discusses and 
explains why one particular type of legal history on the surface remains starkly 
incompatible with contemporary self-interpretations of the nature, purpose and 
commitments of the socio-legal studies movement, although as will become clear, 
this is no longer exclusively the case. Hence, this writer‟s methodology combines 
elements of theoretical argumentation with empirical illustration, the combination of 
which allows her to draw specific conclusions, hopefully in ways that offset the one-
sided quality of each.  
 
On the Importance of Historical Knowledge 
Presuppositions of knowledge of the past  
A theoretical case can be made for the inclusion of historical contextualisation as part 
of the interdisciplinary mix that is one of the distinctive features of socio-legal studies 
of law in action. A key argument here is that many, if not all, examples of socio-legal 
research inevitably presuppose at least certain aspects of knowledge of the past. 
This remains true even where this is assumed, rather than subjected to detailed 
investigation and empirical reconstruction. Take, for instance, the theme of law and 
discrimination. One variant on policy-relevant socio-legal research is those studies 
that are prompted by supposedly progressive judicial decisions and legislative 
interventions that have enlarged the rights of historically disadvantaged groups 
and/or groups subject to continuing forms of legal and social discrimination.18 This 
type of research will typically welcome judicial or legislative innovations as an 
overdue, if not necessarily sufficient, corrective to past discriminatory policies 
enshrined in legally sanctioned or enabled practices. Such policy-oriented research 
                                                 
17
 John Philip Reid, „The Layers of Western Legal History‟, in Mclaren et al (eds), Law for the Elephant, 
p.22.   
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 Jennifer Brown, „Discriminatory experiences of women police: a comparison of officers serving in 
England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland‟, International Journal  
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also emphasises its contextual limitations - and hence the perceived need for further 
legislative extension and entrenching of the right in question.19 Most is rarely 
informed by original historical reconstruction of events and patterns of change based 
on primary historical sources. Yet it nevertheless presupposes the truth of such 
discriminatory policies in order to identify the ways in which specific groups have, in 
fact, been historically disadvantaged, and the continuing legacy of such 
disadvantage. 
 
The contingency of the present  
It is necessary to address the argument that historical research is, by definition, not 
specifically socio-legal, and vice-versa. One argument suggests that the escalating 
instabilities and rapidity of contemporary social, cultural and technological changes 
disrupt all continuities with the past and therefore render historical studies 
obsolescent (but see later for other perspectives).20 Against this view the following 
counter-arguments may be advanced. First, both generally and certainly with respect 
to many themes addressed by socio-legal research, it is rarely possible to draw a 
clear-cut distinction between the past and present. This is because the present state 
of the research topic remains encrusted with the legacy of all that it is perceived as 
having become over a sustained period of time. This writer suggests that this may be 
an inherent feature of legal research undertaken within a nine hundred year old 
common law legal system. Furthermore, that this explains why many of those 
contributions to the socio-legal studies movement, which are not exclusively historical 
in their approach, nevertheless reconstruct, at least in an outline fashion, recent 
developments within their research topics.21 Moreover, even within the materials 
studied by black letter scholarship, it is important to recognise that a trial process will 
typically involve a degree of historical reconstruction. The trial lawyers who are 
engaged in this partial reconstruction will inevitably contest both the facts and their 
legal implications. 
 
A further example can be found within research conducted concerning contemporary 
war crimes trials. They are, for example, repeatedly defined as partial continuations 
and reactivation of the „Nuremberg legacy‟. The history of these trials is now being 
rewritten to reflect how recent developments, such as the creation of the ad hoc 
                                                 
19
 Lisa Glennon, „Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd - An Endorsement of The Functional 
Family?‟ International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 14, (2000) 226.  
20
 See John Tosh, The Pursuit of History (Longmans, 1991) Chap 1. This proposition is advanced by 
that writer to serve primarily as a focus for many counter-arguments.  
21
 Maureen O'Sullivan, „Making copyright ambidextrous: an expose of copyleft‟ Journal of Information 
Law and Technology  (2002), 3. 
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Rwandan and former-Yugoslavia tribunals, the emergence of a permanent 
International Criminal Court and recent cases at the International Court of Justice, 
have recognised, extended and also challenged this increasingly „contemporary‟ 
legacy.22 A similar point applies to social welfare legislation that extends the legacy of 
the pioneering reforms creating the modern welfare state whilst incorporating 
principles derived from the supposedly abolished poor law.  
    
Law as history 
There is another cluster of arguments suggesting that the very process of studying 
law in action cannot forsake a historical form of analysis. The idea of taking a 
particular event or topic as the object of socio-legal (or any other type of) research 
necessarily requires scholars to enter into historical enquiries. This is needed in order 
to appreciate the extent to which the guiding ideas, beliefs and values contained 
within, or otherwise attributed to or associated with, the research topic, have come to 
be constituted in their present but still developing form. The impact of changing 
contexts, and the resulting lessons of the power of contingency, provisionality and 
openness to transformation are positively enhanced by historical contextualisation in 
ways that can call in question established socio-legal accounts and other 
interpretations of legal topics.23 Gordon has recognised that legal histories are 
capable of contributing to the wider tasks of critiquing ideologies supportive of the 
status quo: 
[anything] that produces disturbances in the field - that inverts or 
scrambles familiar narratives of stasis, recovery or progress; anything 
that advances rival perspectives (such as those of the losers rather 
than the winners) for surveying developments, or that posits 
alternative trajectories that might have produced a very different 
present - in short any approach that unsettles the familiar strategies 
that we use to tame the past in order to normalise the present.24  
 
It would be impossible to seriously conduct research into legal aspects of genocide, 
for example, without considering how this legal category first developed in response 
to a series of specific historical events and processes, and then became refined 
through a succession of measures within international and domestic law, such as the 
                                                 
22
 Michael Salter and Lorie Charlesworth: „Prosecuting and defending diplomats as war criminals: 
Ribbentrop at the Nuremberg Trial,‟ Liverpool Law Review: Genocide and War Crimes Trials Vol. II, 
27(1) (2006), 67-96, pp.67-77. 
23
 Leslie Sheinman, „Ethical practice or practical ethics? The case of the vendor-purchaser rule‟, Legal 
Ethics  3(1) (2000), 27-49; Shane Kilcommins, „Context and contingency in the historical penal process: 
the revision of revisionist analysis using the twelve judges' notebooks as one tool of analysis‟, Hold. L.R. 
19(1) (1998), 1-54. 
24
 R. Gordon, „Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism‟ Stanford  Law Review 49, (1997), 1023, 
1024, with this writer‟s proviso that the extreme extension of this suggestion, counter-factual histories, 
are rarely more that jeux d’esprit. 
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1948 Genocide Convention. This legal response can only be properly understood 
through a close reconstruction of the factors underlying and explaining such 
changes.  
In a very different subject area, but for similar reasons, there appears to be growing 
recognition amongst some socio-legal writers that a similar point demonstrably 
applies to the need to understand the recent history of aspects of contemporary 
housing law and policies, including how different interest groups have deployed key 
concepts within different ideological discourses concerning leasehold reform.25 
Furthermore, for socio-legal research, it is impossible to study the operation of law 
without becoming conscious of, and working on, source materials and institutional 
settings, language patterns and protocols that clearly stem from the past.  The very 
intelligibility of these require scholars to expand their temporal horizons by 
interpreting such materials as the most recent phases of a longstanding, but still 
developing, process of historical evolution.  
 
In short, the importance of historical contextualisation for the law in action project of 
socio-legal scholarship, is that it allows the significance of recent legal and policy 
reforms to be considered in a wider and more subtle manner. As such, these reforms 
can be better understood by a form of socio-legal analysis which locates such 
reforms within the context of a series of transformations whose patterns and 
trajectory have unfolded over many decades.26 Such contextualisation interprets the 
past not for its own sake but rather to allow the significance and implications of 
current events to be more adequately understood than would otherwise be the case. 
Even where the period of contextualisation does not extend to the present, a similar 
enhancement of our knowledge of present day phenomena is still possible. 
Furthermore, the interpretation of the meaning and implications of even currently 
emerging events still remain determined, to a greater or lesser extent, by a certain 
understanding of the past. For example, they are influenced by whether they are 
perceived as being completely unprecedented, („a radical departure‟), or as 
modifications of earlier situations combining elements of novelty with more familiar 
features. In each case, the interpretation of the meaning of an evolving topic within 
socio-legal studies necessarily draws in part upon a certain understanding of earlier 
developments, and hence historical knowledge. Consider, for example, the analysis 
of the implications for policing and criminal justice systems of the British handover of 
                                                 
25
 Sarah Blandy and David Robinson, „Reforming leasehold: discursive events and outcomes 1984-
2000‟. Journal of Law and Society 28(3) (2001), 384-408. 
26
 Claude Martin and Irene Thery, „The PACS and marriage and cohabitation in France‟, International 
Journal of Law Public Policy and the Family 15(1) (2001), 135-158. 
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Hong Kong to China in 1997. A viable form of socio-legal analysis would surely need 
to consider the tension between long-standing traditions of colonial and other forms 
of policing in a manner that included some measure of historical understanding of 
this relationship both generally and in the specific case of this particular colony. 
Clearly, any attempts to justify one or more of these interpretations of such events 
are only possible by drawing upon reliable and pre-existing historical knowledge.  
 
Indeed, one of the claimed advantages of historical reconstruction within socio-legal 
themes is the discovery that many reforms or supposedly „new‟ approaches to the 
understanding of legal developments re-enact aspects of long forgotten initiatives 
from past centuries. One example concerns supposedly „novel‟ and groundbreaking 
theories of the „risk society‟ formulated by criminal justice specialists and 
criminologists deploying statistical analysis to classify and order criminal activity, 
which can be shown to recapitulate the analysis of certain seventeenth century 
economists.27 In a similar manner, the rationale and operation of the Child Support 
Agency demonstrates, in part, a continuation of four hundred year old poor law 
principles. Moreover, this perspective has relevance for the wider issue of legal 
education itself. Such a view has been articulated within the following response to 
one account of the Legal System whose authors, Cownie and Bradney, have 
contributed to the development of the socio-legal approach within legal education 
and research. The reviewer notes: 
that the history of British legal education has over the last three 
decades been “replete” with those who have “rejected the black-letter 
tradition” from a range of critical/ideological perspectives. Cownie and 
Bradney recognise, quite rightly I think, that the ideological effects of 
“traditional” legal education have been more complex than is 
sometimes made out; that “... there is nothing new in the suggestion 
that the study of legal doctrine is insufficient on its own” (p 134). The 
widening of the nature of legal scholarship that has taken place is thus 
interpreted in a broadly positive light. Indeed, it is in drawing on this 
diverse material that the authors frame their “pluralist”, “integrated 
theory” approach.28 
 
Indeed within that context, of British legal education, a number of socio-legal writers 
have noted a related justificatory and rationalisation strategy at play within aspects of 
the black letter textbook tradition.29 In part, history is continually in the process of 
                                                 
27
 George S. Rigakos and Richard W. Hadden, „Crime, capitalism and the "risk society": towards the 
same old modernity?‟ Theoretical Criminology 5(1) (2001), 61-84; Pat O'Malley, „Discontinuity, 
government and risk: a response to Rigakos and Hadden‟, Theoretical Criminology 5(1), (2000), 85-92. 
28
 R. Collier, „Book Review‟: http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1998/issue1/collier1.html [January 2007] 
29
 Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law, (Butterworths, 1993), 
pp. 7-9; Michael Doupe and Michael Salter, „The Cheshire World-view‟, Kings College Law Journal, 
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being re-written and contested within present scholarship and beyond and, for socio-
legal scholars as for members of the Centre for Contemporary History (CCBH) at the 
Institute for Historical Research (IHR) at the University of London, this contestation 
takes place with a view to its implications for the immediate future. This presence of 
competing interpretations and reinterpretations of the significance and implications of 
historical events remains a perennial feature of the contemporary manifestation of 
many if not all socio-legal themes. As such, it cannot be bracketed out without 
impoverishing our understanding of such topics. 
 
Therefore, this writer would suggest that, even those subscribers to socio-legal 
studies whose focus remains resolutely fixed upon the present cannot ignore these 
elements of the presence of the past that continues to permeate their field of 
research. The history of those developments whose most recent manifestations are 
studied by socio-legal researchers can never become entirely settled. It can, and 
often does constitute a battleground between competing perspectives on the topic in 
question that reinterpret the past to consolidate, revise or subvert the perceived 
legitimacy of aspects of the status quo. For example, one possible topic for socio-
legal research is precisely how authoritarian regimes respond to threats to their 
position represented by „open‟ histories, for example of human rights developments 
and labour history. It is possible to study how such officially perceived threats are 
censored and combated through the production of official and self-justificatory 
historical accounts more supportive of „traditional‟ values, recent past or status quo.30 
Their opponents may also mobilise a selective interpretation of the past to suggest 
that the present regime are trampling upon longstanding common law rights and 
liberties, or that an officially suppressed history of resistance exists, an underside 
social history, which should guide future struggles. 31  
       
Assumptions about the (legal) past  
The implication of the above arguments is that, even those scholars within socio-
legal studies who renounce historical enquiries at the methodological level, remain 
subject to a paradox. They cannot avoid being confronted by a number of aspects of 
their research topics that remain unintelligible unless interpreted through the lens of 
specific contemporary assumptions about the continuation and modification of the 
                                                                                                                                            
11(1) (2000), p. 49; Michael Doupe and Michael Salter, „Concealing the Past? Questioning Textbook 
Interpretations of the History of Equity and Trusts‟, Liverpool Law Review, 2-3 (2000), 253. 
30
 See for example, „official‟ histories produced in Germany, both under the Third Reich and until 
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past within the present. These points undermine the assertion that legal scholarship, 
or at least a form of scholarship which aspires to be self-conscious of the nature and 
limits of its own research practices, can forsake historical enquiries by concentrating 
on the immediate present as if this could ever be fully abstracted from the past.32 
Such arguments support the contention that an application of some form of historical 
methodology is required as an integral part of the wider interdisciplinary mix that is 
central to the socio-legal project.  
 
Alternatively, professional historians are greatly concerned with the purposes of 
history but reject the proposition that history teaches us lessons.33 Indeed, such an 
assertion cannot be sustained at any level of sophistication except that, for a lawyer 
working in the common law tradition, precedent does indeed provide „lessons‟ drawn 
in lines from the past to today. This is not teleological history rather it is a legal 
technique. In this context, the socio-legal approach to historical reconstructions 
discussed above, which draws upon the past to inform present and future reform 
proposals, tends to indicate that, in this, legal histories may be somewhat different. 
On the other hand, Mandler has suggested that histories as such have great 
imaginative power that can allow us to highlight our own values and assumptions as 
we view the past through our own standpoint and define it more clearly.34 This search 
for identity has characterised not only the professional study of history but also the 
socio-legal academic community researching in the sub-disciplines of, for example, 
law and literature, gender and feminist studies and law and semiotics.  
 
In this context, Mandler connects a search for identity with philosophy, the writing of 
fiction and the development of a history of empathy (e-history?) through history from 
below. The danger, he posits, for both the writer and the reader, is that of affirmation. 
The historian who claims to be seeking the truth may be concealing bias. As a result, 
Mandler argues for a history that provides a tough intellectual context for material 
that interests and engages us all, a point not lost on the socio-legal researcher. This 
is supported by Evans who notes: „History is becoming a more theoretically and 
epistemologically self-conscious discipline‟.35  In order to achieve his purpose, 
Mandler draws local and family history into the pool of knowledge that can provide a 
discrete role for the historian in separating the objective from the personal, the 
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intellectual from the emotional and the fanciful from the primary source. 36 In this 
context, the scholarly study of history can protect society from myth making and 
provide an intellectual honesty and integrity in the endeavour far removed from David 
Irving‟s versions of the past. 
 
Smith and McLaren echo these sentiments when they claim that: „…legal 
historiography has relevance to, and the ability to insinuate itself into, practically 
every region and crevice of legal study and scholarship‟.37 Thus, if true with respect 
to traditional legal and historical scholarship, this writer would suggest that this claim 
must also apply to interdisciplinary historical work within socio-legal studies. To that 
end, many leading commentators, such as Twining, have recognised this as one of 
the distinctive tendencies of a type of legal scholarship: „that views almost everything 
through the multiple lenses of several disciplines.‟38 In both multi- and 
interdisciplinary legal scholarship, the aim is to: „transcend disciplinary boundaries by 
taking as the focus the subject area of law in society.‟39 As such, those surveying 
contemporary legal history have implied that analysing historical contexts harmonises 
with the generally interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary character of socio-legal 
studies, with Smith and McLaren characterising:  „…contemporary legal 
historiography as the quintessence of a multidisciplinary pursuit, moving within the 
political and social sciences, the humanities, and beneficially borrowing from and 
drawing on the insights of each‟.40  
 
It is arguable, that few types of academic analysis can claim to be as interdisciplinary 
or contextual in their approach to scholarly research as the academic study of 
history. This is a discipline that includes conferences, sub-fields and specialist 
journals that positively embrace, amongst others, economic, social, political, 
institutional, social policy, gender and cultural contexts, and their complex and inter-
changing relationship. It is also arguable, therefore, that at least certain types of 
historical methods and analytical techniques could be included within any approach 
to legal research and scholarship that, like socio-legal studies, emphasises the 
importance of distinctly interdisciplinary forms of contextual analysis.41 In short, this 
                                                 
36
 Professional historians too have a sense of academic hierarchies: „Family history is often extensively 
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 William Twining, „Remembering 1972‟ in D. J. Galligan (ed), Socio-legal Studies in Context, The 
Oxford Centre Past and Future, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1995), p.43.  
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reconstruction suggests that, providing socio-legal studies remain committed to an 
interdisciplinary approach to studying „law in context‟, there is no reason either in 
principle or in practice why historical contextualisation must be excluded from the 
scope of socio-legal research. On the contrary, this writer would endorse the more 
positive argument that contextualisation of legal topics over extended periods of time 
remains one-sided and incomplete if the equally important issue of their emergence, 
development and transformation over time is ignored. Indeed, it is possible to identify 
many examples of historically oriented socio-legal research that have been generally 
accepted as comprising a vital part of this movement‟s analytical techniques. For 
example, a number of the early and groundbreaking works in the „law in context‟ 
academic series, of which more later, made a specific virtue of their commitment to, 
and practice of, historical contextualisation.42 This commitment was evident even in 
traditionally unpromising areas of socio-legal scholarship, such as contract and 
equity and trusts.43  
 
The American perspective on socio-legal historical reconstructions 
By 1994, the ESRC‟s review of socio-legal studies rightly acknowledged the 
importance of at least social scientific forms of historical analysis when it noted: 
„Socio-legal Studies may also embrace a significant comparative methodology, 
investigating the social scientific context of law across and between legal systems, 
both spatially and temporally, including supra national developments.‟44 In 2006, the 
ESRC records that: „Socio-legal staff and socio-legal studies are predominantly found 
in law schools‟, but notes: „[T]his research is particularly geared to the needs of 
policy-makers‟.45 However, these boundaries have been transcended within the 
American branch of the socio-legal studies movement, which in other areas have 
been influential upon scholarly developments within Britain. Levine, for instance, has 
maintained that socio-legal researchers should attempt to examine: „data from 
different time periods, units of analysis, and locales; seeking explanation in specific 
contexts; and searching for coherent results through multiple methods, across long 
time spans, and in comparative perspective‟ [emphasis added].46 To take two 
examples to stand for many, the American Law and Society Association have 
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42
 R. Harris, Introduction to Law (Butterworths, 1983). 
43
 Graham Moffat, Trusts Law: Texts and Materials, (Butterworths, 1994, 2
nd
 ed.); Hugh Collins The Law 
of Contract,  (Butterworths, 1997, 3rd ed.). 
44





 F. Levine, „Presidential Address,‟ Law and Society Review (1990), 1-25, p. 24. 
Crimes and Misdemeanours 1/1 (2007) ISSN 1754-0445 
 
 15  
introduced an annual award, the Hurst Prize in Socio-Legal History.47 In addition, the 
University of Chicago Press publishes a considerable amount of research that 
contextualises, even prioritises, interdisciplinary socio-legal historical 
reconstructions.48 Thus, with respect to historical reconstructions, there is evidence 
that American forms of socio-legal studies have become more receptive than British 
models. This is particularly the case for research concerned with twentieth century 
historical developments.49 Within American socio-legal literature, there has been an 
explicit inclusion of historical methods, particularly „locally based‟ types, into aspects 
of socio-legal studies.50 These include historical studies of legally sanctioned 
punishment in areas as diverse as intellectual property, corporate securities, the 
regulation of drugs, and tax fraud.51 
 
This account of a developing tendency within American socio-legal scholarship, to 
increasingly recognise the value of historical studies, stands in opposition to the 
argument that those empirical studies that analyse legal topics, by identifying and 
placing them within their developing historical contexts and onward trajectory, 
represent contributions to the discipline of history and therefore not to law. One irony 
of any such rejection of historical contextualisation from those within the socio-legal 
movement is that one of the pioneers of sociology of law, Pound, is widely 
acknowledged to have derived many of his original insights from an extensive review 
and historical contextualisation of legal phenomena.52 A similar point could be made 
with respect to a number of other pioneers of, and inspirations for social sciences, 
not least Weber and, to a lesser extent, Marx.53  
    
Meanwhile in Britain … 
If the argument that certain types of historical reconstruction, which this writer 
discusses below, both exist and ought to be fully assimilated into the toolkit of socio-
legal studies is correct, then this claim must be substantiated by reference to a far 
greater range of empirical supportive evidence than the writer has discussed to date. 
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Fortunately, there are no shortages of examples of distinctly and recognisably socio-
legal research that positively embrace historical reconstructions as part of their wider 
interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary mix. As noted above, one possible impediment to 
any wider recognition of historical contextualisation stems from the view that history 
is rooted firmly within the humanities, whereas socio-legal studies draws its 
inspiration from the methods and techniques of the social sciences. Thomas has, 
however, considered that, although the early work within socio-legal studies drew 
mainly on the social sciences, more recently there has been an increasing interest in 
the application of analytical approaches stemming from the humanities.54 Thomas‟s 
point on the recent broadening of the scope of socio-legal methodologies can be 
supported by reference to diverse research that has drawn inspiration from various 
aspects of the humanities, including social philosophy, linguistics, history, law and 
literature55 and film criticism.56 
 
This inclusion of historical, as well as spatial contextualisation, formed one part of the 
earliest contributions to British socio-legal studies. The pioneering research by the 
Oxford Centre for Socio-legal Studies involved, as a matter of principle, close 
collaboration between legal academics and social historians, as well as statisticians, 
economists, sociologists and others.57 The commitment to include a distinctly 
historical type of contextualisation represented one of the multidisciplinary 
methodologies developed throughout this centre‟s first two decades. In 1983, Donald 
Harris, a former Director of the Oxford Centre wrote: 
We believe that in the immediate future, progress in socio-legal 
studies will best be made by building up a number of detailed studies 
of particular topics in the law, using as many relevant perspectives as 
our resources permit. If we bring together the insights of sociology, 
economics, psychology and history upon a particular problem area in 
society, we hope that the cumulative effect will be a deeper 
understanding than could be gained from any one discipline, given the 
all-pervasive nature of law in its social context.58 
 
More recently, there are a number of examples of multi and interdisciplinary studies 
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that can be classified as illustrations of the benefits that can flow from that inclusion 
of historical contextualisation within the scope of socio-legal studies (see below). In 
addition, recognition of the importance of historical contextualisation as part of the 
wider tool kit of socio-legal studies has, if anything strengthened during the last 
decade. By 2000, the ESRC suggested that:  
Research training may include material such as the following: … 
different theoretical perspectives on deviance, crime and criminal 
justice (e.g. sociological, psychological, legal, historical, cultural and 
anthropological) [and] the social history of the discipline of criminology 
and/or socio-legal studies.59  
    
As a further positive indication, initial impressions of the lack of legal history 
scholarship within socio-legal studies are deceptive. For example, in the 2005 SLSA 
Directory, only seven members listed legal history as a particular research interest, 
indeed not all of these researchers have published specifically on legal history. Of 
those who have, two are well known for their contributions to other socio-legal 
subjects. Bibbings has published on conscientious objectors in the Great War,60 as 
well as on gender, rights and the body, whilst Probert, a convenor for Family Law and 
Policy at Society of Legal Scholars‟ (SLS) conferences, has been a regular 
contributor to the legal history stream. She has widely published on the Marriage Act 
of 1753, including within a mainstream history journal.61 On the other hand, there are 
numerous examples of conference papers which contextualise history within socio-
legal studies presented by scholars who do not list legal history as a particular 
interest, as this writer will illustrate below.  
 
Certainly, historical research has been increasingly included amongst the examples 
of papers presented at annual SLSA conferences. For instance, at the SLSA 
conference held at Nottingham Trent University in 2003, seven sessions were 
dedicated to „law and history‟.62 At the SLSA Conference held at the University of 
Liverpool in 2005, there were four legal history sessions,63 with a further distinct 
stream of four sessions the University of Stirling in 2006.  In fact, many regular 
speakers at the SLSA include an historical dimension to their papers utilising a 
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reconstruction of past events and processes as an integral part of their wider 
interdisciplinary methodology. These papers have appeared in an assortment of 
conference streams that reflect the subject matter researched, such as housing law 
and policy, rather than the particular methodological approach taken to the topic in 
question. These streams have included, amongst others, environmental law,64 legal 
education,65 tax,66 and „law and the question of identity‟.67 In short, it is clear that 
legal history, understood broadly as a reconstruction of the processes of emergence, 
consolidation and change over time, has exhibited a consistent, if partially concealed, 
presence within recent SLSA conferences. Such analytical techniques of 
reconstruction have provided an important methodological tool for contextualising a 
wide range of otherwise disparate socio-legal themes.  At the same time, more 
overtly historical reconstructions are emerging as an important theme for socio-legal 
studies scholarship in their own right.68 The following subsections will provide further 
evidence of the role that different forms of historical reconstruction have played within 
the development of socio-legal studies to date in Britain, starting with the largest area 
where this is the case: studies of the criminal justice system. 
 
An Overview of British Socio-Legal Histories    
 Criminal justice 
Much of the existing contribution to legal history within socio-legal studies can be 
found concentrated in the field of criminal justice. These have included, amongst 
many other topics, studies of the overlap between criminalisation and other areas, 
such as the legal regulation of medicine in the field of the emergence of a defence to 
infanticide,69 and the identification and regulation of the „dangerous‟ offender within 
the penal system.70 In addition, as noted in the introduction, much work since the 
1970‟s bears direct or indirect testimony to influential works from social historians; 
these stimulated an interest in the potential for critical historical work on the role of 
the state, ideology and criminal law. Particularly prominent works in this area include, 
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Thompson‟s Whigs and Hunters, 71 which contextualised the eighteenth century 
Black Act, and has influenced Norrie‟s work: 
This is Thompson‟s point when he writes that the law entails “a logic of 
equity”, a tendency to seek “to transcend the inequalities of class 
power which, instrumentally, it is harnessed to serve.” Criminal law 
protects particular social interests but it does through a language that 
is universal and general, and cast in terms of respect for the individual 
before it. 72 
 
Equally important is the companion work, Albion’s Fatal Tree.73 Hay‟s own chapter in 
this book: „Property, Authority and the Criminal Law‟, characterises England‟s 
eighteenth century criminal justice system as an: „instrument of social hegemony, 
coercion and manipulation, exercised by the ruling class through legislative and 
sentencing practices.‟74  
 
Currently within British socio-legal scholarship, it is possible to find research 
developing these and other themes. Thus for example, Lacey contextualises the 
process of criminalisation and punishment by reference to wider patterns of social 
and economic change.75 Other studies have reconstructed the social factors 
explaining the historical emergence and transformation of the legal regulation of 
blackmail within England and Wales.76 There have also been attempts to re-examine 
nineteenth century data to develop a specifically „ecological analysis‟ of crime in early 
Victorian England.77 One example within criminal justice scholarship merits particular 
discussion: Ballinger‟s Dead Women Walking: Executed Women in England and 
Wales 1900–1955.78 This work was recognised as an outstanding contribution to 
socio-legal studies by its award of the Hart SLSA prize. It is a major critical and 
interdisciplinary study, in effect a social history of the power of law and related 
institutions to subject women to capital punishment. It combines an account of 
biographical details contextualised by reference to an analysis of previously 
unpublished archival material, and existing feminist theories of law. Her work 
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represents an interesting example of empirical historical analysis that has also been 
recognised as contributing to socio-legal studies of the institutional operation of the 
criminal justice system. In addition, aspects of Foucault‟s work, which stresses the 
causal role played by modernisation, and the associated drive for greater efficiencies 
in institutional practices and strategies of control, have influenced a number of 
broadly socio-legal histories of criminal justice.79 Such historical reconstructions offer 
a rewarding methodology for illuminating law‟s „past‟.  
 
International and comparative socio-legal histories  
In addition, there have been a number of comparative historical projects.80 For 
example, De Vries‟s study addresses the issue of the Dutch campaign against 
trafficking in women for sexual exploitation within brothels and elsewhere. 81 Another 
such comparative historical study has reconstructed the processes through which the 
prohibition of alcohol was first introduced into nineteenth century Hawaii.82 The wider 
literature on socio-legal approaches to criminal justice includes other comparative 
histories of the youth justice systems in Scotland and England and Wales. For 
example, McAra focused on the reasons why the two legal systems diverged during 
the 1970s until the late 1990s, and how the Scottish system developed techniques of 
punishment that had been established but then abandoned decades earlier in 
England and Wales.83 A further socio-legal project has identified five stages in the 
history of crime regulation within common law regimes through a comparative 
analysis of differences between US and Australian penal histories.84 
 
Other socio-legal comparative accounts have considered early dispute resolution,85 
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and same sex adult relationships.86 Socio-legal studies that have focused on 
nineteenth century developments include Brown‟s research into aspects of the 
deployment of ideological doctrines and strategies of both orthodox and authoritarian 
liberalism through which Britain governed its empire partly by means of specific 
legislative measures, taking the governance of the Mina tribe as a case study.87 The 
established socio-legal theme of legal pluralism, which discusses the relationship 
between formal law and unofficial or lay understandings of law and justice, has also 
been subjected to historical reconstruction. For example, one such study investigates 
the development of legal system under autocratic rule of a national governor in the 
British colony of New South Wales from 1788.88 
 
Legal regulation of property and housing 
One of the most strikingly consistent areas of socio-legal research where writers 
have undertaken some measure of historical contextualisation is within the area of 
housing studies, including its human rights aspects. As such, it has become almost 
de rigueur to locate any discussion of current themes concerning housing law and 
policy within the context of historical changes that have taken place over the last 20 
years, and - in some cases - over a much longer period.89 Within empirical research 
investigating the legal regulation of property relations more generally, one explicitly 
socio-legal history has analysed perceptions by dominant elites of legal measures of 
enclosure and other restrictions on access to land, particularly with reference to their 
impact upon working class leisure activities.90 Another piece of research in this area 
deals with questions concerning the relationship between eighteenth century property 
settlements and issues concerning the social status and recognition for those 
aristocratic families who deployed this legal device to protect family capital.91 A rather 
differing example has studied both the influence of national and local politics upon 
solicitor‟s traditional conveyancing monopoly.92 These few examples serve to 
illustrate the breadth of possibilities open to socio-legal researchers within this 
subject area. 
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Public law, civil liberties and human rights 
There have only been a small number of socio-legal histories that could be classified 
under even an elastic definition of this heading. Under the broad heading of studies 
of the emergence of public regulation, MacDonah‟s work conceptualises and 
contextualises the historical development of English local and central governance.93 
More recently, Stebbings‟ research examines the growth of „officialdom‟ in the 
nineteenth century, the compulsory administration of private affairs by state 
officials.94 Within the domestic realm, explicitly socio-legal forms of historical 
reconstruction have addressed changing patterns of extra-legal and legal recognition 
of freedom of speech by reference, for example, to the regulation of Speakers‟ 
Corner in London‟s Hyde Park.95 Socio-legal writers have also contextualised civil 
liberty issues arising from the controversial emergence in Northern Ireland of special 
control units within those prisons containing republican paramilitary prisoners.96 
There have also been distinctly socio-legal historical contextualisations of changing 
patterns of twentieth century constitutional interaction, and in particular the 
emergence and development of institutional conflicts between the judges and 
different governments.97 As a supplement to domestic studies, within the field of 
human rights scholarship there is also a distinctly comparative form of historical 
contextualisation, including studies of the influence of particular national traditions 
upon the reception of newly incorporated European human rights measures.98  
 
Social welfare, family and gender    
More positively, there have been a considerable number of explicitly socio-legal 
histories under these headings. These include a series of studies into nineteenth 
century occupational-health legislation, which have found outlets in both history and 
law publishing.99 The field of governmental regulation of factory conditions is one 
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area where the historical work of Carson broke new ground.100 More specifically, 
Dunn has conducted historical research addressing the social, economic and political 
policy factors underpinning the „regulation‟ of charities created to relieve poverty.101 
The work of Bartlett on the history of lunatic asylums during mid-nineteenth century 
England, which builds upon a broadly Foucaultian analysis, is another noteworthy 
example of critical accounts of social welfare provisions for those at the bottom of the 
social hierarchy.102 In addition, this writer has published socio-legal historical 
reconstructions of the poor law.103 The narrower field of family law and policy 
continues to attract high quality forms of historical contextualisation by Eekelar and 
various collaborators.104 
 
Another, explicitly socio-legal collection of essays explores the question „what is a 
parent?‟ from the disciplinary orientation of history, as well as those of sociology, 
psychology, biology, and criminology.105 A similar point applies to certain studies 
within the overlap between studies of social welfare policy and the legal regulation of 
familial relations,106 and to comparative studies of the legal responses to 
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unconventional family relations within broadly analogous common law regimes, such 
as Canada.107 Historical dimensions are most fully integrated in O‟Donovan‟s 
innovative, Sexual Divisions in Law,108 which treats historical analysis as a pre-
eminent way of explaining the:  
legal differentiation between women and men were sought in the 
structure for pre-industrial English society, in the material facts of 
biological reproduction, and in the organisation of home and work in 
modern industrialised society …. The enquiry undertaken by the book 
is directed partly at social change. The model that underpins this 
analysis is a model of social change in which there is a movement 
from a community-based society…to an individualistic society.109 
 
Her aim is to explain how the patriarchal family form, which flourished in medieval 
and early modern European culture, survives today in another guise, and she 
accounts for this by the emergence of an unregulated private realm. In addition, there 
are, for example, a number of published discussions of the legal regulation of lesbian 
sexual relations including arguments for and against parity with heterosexual 
relationships concerning the age of consent, and the appropriateness of a universal, 
gender-neutral legal framework. One socio-legal study addresses this issue through 
a historical reconstruction of the first criminal codification of the age of consent by the 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861, its subsequent interpretation by a cluster of 
evolving case law, through to more recent debate over sex between women, 
including the impact of lesbian feminist perspectives in the 1970s and contemporary 
policy debates regarding the limits of anti-discrimination measures.110 
 
Some might argue that, „history for its own sake‟ is not an acceptable project for 
socio-legal historians; even so, this type of historical reconstruction can hardly be 
dismissed as falling outside the scope of socio-legal studies. This is because it draws 
lessons from the historical trajectory which culminates in a critical discussion of the 
policy dimensions of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 in the context of the relative 
advantages and costs to young lesbian women of campaigning for a standardised 
age of consent law, including a possible increase in the number of prosecutions for 
lesbian acts.111 Moreover, other socio-legal themes relating to law‟s definition and 
regulation of gender identities have benefited from historical scholarship, including 
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studies of the British state‟s reaction to injuries caused by stereotypically masculine 
activities within the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as duelling,112 and 
reconstructions of early twentieth century attempts to censure the early suffragette 
movement.113 A similar point applies to those studies by historians of the changing 
historical treatment of women within, and by, the English criminal justice system.114 
 
The legal regulation of professions  
Studies of the work and orientation of different branches of professions that are 
involved in the legal process, or which are regulated by legislative provisions are 
common within socio-legal studies. 115 An example of distinctly socio-legal historical 
work is Smith‟s reconstruction of the self-regulation of the professional conduct of 
doctors by the General Medical Council since its inception in 1858.116 A further group 
of studies, in this case addressing policing, include Wall‟s impressive work on the 
social history of the chief constables between 1836 and 1996;117 it suggests that it is 
possible to identify recurring tendencies within the historical development of the 
police.  
 
This necessarily brief survey of some of the many socio-legal historical 
reconstructions produced from within the socio-legal movement presents a more 
positive picture than that painted at the beginning of this article. In spite of this, there 
is no clear evidence within the literature of a self-aware or acknowledged discrete 
group of historians within the socio-legal movement. However, such a „cluster‟ has 
formed and has arranged a series of conferences at the Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies (IALS) in collaboration with the CCBH and IHR, under the title: „Socio-legal 
historical reconstructions: the lived experience of the law‟.118 The first took place in 
December 2006 and the next in December 2007. Thus, as will be discussed in more 
detail below, there are some positive signs that researchers producing socio-legal 
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historical reconstructions are beginning to affirm a discrete identity within the socio-
legal movement. Meanwhile, however, the descriptor legal history still creates a 
resonance within socio-legal scholars that is not appealing to members of the socio-
legal movement. The following sections will consider how and why this situation 
arose and continues. 
 
The Negative Side of the Balance Sheet 
In contrast to the dynamic position across the Atlantic, and despite the important 
work discussed above, much British socio-legal research still suffers from the 
„parochialism of the present‟; that is an excessive focus on novel developments 
within the immediate present and upon „unprecedented‟ changes in the 
circumstances in which law is applied. This has led to widespread ignorance of the 
potentially instructive fate of analogous past reforms.119 Harris notes that, in 
comparison with research into nineteenth century developments, „Surprisingly little 
research has been conducted into twentieth century history of law‟, and that we are 
therefore largely dependent upon the work of social historians for our knowledge of 
this period.120   Furthermore, it has to be accepted that, in spite of some hopeful 
signs, the potential for historical analysis within socio-legal studies still remains, to 
some extent, an underdeveloped aspect of this movement. Although it is strong in 
certain areas such as criminal justice and family law, it remains far weaker in most of 
the other fields that regularly attract streams in SLSA conferences. Within the „law in 
context‟ series of publications for example, there is varied treatment of the historical 
context. This ranges from the full-blown historical reconstruction by O‟Donovan 
(above)121 at one end of the spectrum, to a number of other studies where the 
„context‟ is entirely contemporary.122 Between these extremes sit studies where there 
is a patchy and arguably ad hoc use of historical contextualisation and materials, 
lacking any clear account of why some, but not other, topics merit such 
contextualisation.123 In many cases, it exists rather as an „add on‟ to socio-legal 
research, enriching the project with a contextual history that serves to frame the 
work, rather than constituting its main purpose. One exception is Cranston‟s Legal 
Foundations of the Welfare State, where an extended historical section, spread over 
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two chapters, contextualises the later discussion of the social welfare law and 
policy.124  
As a result, there has been a real shortage of studies within this branch of legal 
scholarship addressing how the implementation of substantive and procedural legal 
rules either changed or, for interesting reasons, remained static. Moreover, such 
types of project have become increasingly difficult to realise, especially given the 
dominance of academic research by the „short-termism‟ encouraged by the time-
scales of the RAE on which law school research funding partly depends. 
Furthermore, the powerful connection between officially funded empirical variants of 
socio-legal research and immediate policy debates has meant that the focus of the 
majority of such studies has fallen excessively upon short-term and immediately 
utilitarian research questions. Such studies have tended to prevail over more 
theoretical, historical and comparative research.125 Noteworthy exceptions have been 
projects such as Davis‟s Partisans and Mediators.126 This included five distinct 
research studies and analysed the results of applying a rich variety of research 
methods to a broad range of sources considered over an extended period of time. As 
noted earlier, there is another aspect of legal history that has played a part in 
alienating the socio-legal studies movement from a perception of the inherent value 
of historical reconstructions in examining the pervasiveness of law through its lived 
experience, This will be considered in the following section. 
 
Versions of Legal History Unattractive to Socio-Legal Studies 
It is not possible to explain the underdeveloped state of historical analysis within 
contemporary socio-legal studies by reference solely to the orientation of members of 
that movement. Instead, it is equally important to recognise that there is another, 
powerful, group who engage in legal history. Their membership comprises the 
Academy, that section of the legal establishment who are the successors to Maine 
who founded the sub-discipline of legal history.127 Indeed, Maine‟s efforts were 
stimulated by the view held by the establishment of the day; that law was an 
insufficiently „academic‟ subject to merit its introduction into universities. His aim was to 
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establish a „scientific‟ (with all that this term implies) basis to the study of history in law, 
as part of that larger project to increase the academic credibility of study of the Common 
Law.128 However, his work, Ancient Law had many technical weaknesses and historical 
inaccuracies that led, after an initial public success, to it being attacked129 and 
subsequently ignored;130 amplified in part, due to Maine's „failure‟ to produce a synthesis 
of law, history and philosophy (Has anyone to date?) and also perhaps to the 
developing anti-history influence of positivist thought. This produced a negative, 
dampening and stultifying effect upon legal historical scholarship, rather as if once 
Gibbon‟s writings had been superseded, historical research regressed to 
antiquarianism.  
 
On the other hand, recent work has reassessed that position, notably that of Cocks and 
MacCormack.131 These have demonstrated that Maine's chief characteristic was to 
show how law and legal institutions were related to specific social conditions and that 
this social development could be viewed as a progression. As such, Maine‟s legacy has 
produced two potential methodologies. The first is based upon the question, what is the 
relationship between certain kinds of society and certain kinds of law? The second 
method is to look at narrow topics, such as the history of contract, on a comparative 
basis by placing them in an historical and social context. Maine's view of a series of 
fixed stages in such analyses is largely discredited, but the English lawyer's 
chronological common law methodology lends itself to this type of historical analysis. 
Indeed, MacCormack has posited: „... for a modern jurist to take an interest in Maine, a 
strong belief in the importance of historical explanation is almost a pre-requisite.132 
Within this context, as the socio-legal movement has emphasised the importance of 
empirical contextual research broadly defined, this writer would suggest that it could in 
fact be viewed as a „truer‟ successor to Maine than those scholars who have chosen 
the current path followed within the Academy. For, as a result of that contemporary 
discrediting of Maine‟s work, the Academy returned to the mainstream, narrow 
doctrinal stance of much legal scholarship; undoubtedly contributing to its apparent 
acceptance by many academics as the „authentic‟ voice speaking for law‟s past 
within the discipline of law. Moreover, membership of the Academy is largely 
dominated by a close-knit group of mostly (male) academics who took their law 
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degrees from the Universities of Cambridge, Oxford and London where they occupy 
prestigious law chairs, some of which have always been designated for legal 
historian. Moreover, this male group are strongly represented on the editorial (and 
honorary editorial) board of The Journal of Legal History, self-described as: „… the 
only British journal concerned solely with legal history‟. Its contents, for example in 
2004 and 2005, demonstrate a movement towards early modern (doctrinal) history, 
but there remains a considerable concentration upon doctrinal studies in Roman Law 
and Medieval writs. Such material is distinctly unappealing to those committed to the 
main tenets of socio-legal studies in its rejection of interdisciplinary research and its 
distinctly non-contextual methodology133 
 
In short, the Academy has an eminent position from which it produces masterly, 
technical paleontological legal history, law‟s past examined from a resolutely black 
letter perspective; an „internal‟ legal history. This is law reflecting upon itself in a 
mirror: doctrinal, Hegelian, Immanent Critique. Its core values are articulated by 
Professor Sir John Baker, in The Cambridge Law Journal which published the text of 
his inaugural lecture as Downing Professor of the Laws of England, Cambridge: „Why 
the History of English Law has not been Finished‟.134 Baker delivered his lecture in 
the same room where Maitland gave his inaugural lecture 110 years earlier in 1888 
when appointed to the same chair. That lecture: „Why the History of English Law has 
not been Written‟, was echoed in Baker‟s response to suggestions that legal history 
is not an important branch of legal scholarship and less relevant to student needs: 
the history of English law must also be an essential dimension in the 
social and intellectual history of this country, as well as being the key 
to understanding much of the available evidence of the past which we 
all now take for granted, … [the aim of research] was to uncover as far 
as possible the original records that constitute the body of 
contemporary evidence and then to interpret them according to the 
social and intellectual settings in which they were produced.135 
 
Seen in these terms, it is possible to see a potential for rapprochement between 
socio-legal scholarship and legal history. However, Baker‟s next words reveal the 
extent of the divide: „I am concerned with the basic truth that history cannot be written 
in any reliable way until the best evidence has been harvested‟.136 
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It is that subsequent failure to follow Maitland, to „harvest‟ the evidence, that so 
exercises Baker and informs his both his lecture and his choice of title. And that 
harvest? It consists of vast shelves of un-transcribed medieval plea rolls and law 
reports, in rolls of sewn-together strips of vellum lying in cool store under the care of 
the National Archives, Kew. The Academy‟s project is the legal equivalent of Cobb‟s 
response to French Revolutionary archives: 
More and more I enjoyed the excitement of research and the 
acquisition of material, often on quite peripheral subjects, as ends in 
themselves. I allowed myself to be deflected down unexpected 
channels, by the chance discovery of a bulky dossier – it might be the 
love letters of a guillotine – or intercepted correspondence from 
London … or eyewitness accounts of the September Massacres or of 
one of the journees.137 
 
For the Academy then, the project becomes a question of scholarship engaged within 
the framework of a black letter doctrinal legal analysis of that material, with a minimal 
contextual input. Such an approach stands in direct contradiction to the socio-legal 
project. In addition, that failure to harvest suggests that a researcher must accept 
that socio-legal historical reconstructions cannot be undertaken in social history, 
economic history, literary studies, post modernism, feminist studies, local history, 
family history, or any branch of the legal past, because „all‟ the recorded law is not 
„known‟. On the contrary, this writer would point to work such as Duffy‟s The Voices 
of Morbath. This demonstrates that other types of records, generated in a legal 
context, (here churchwardens‟ accounts) can provide an alternative methodology for 
the legal historian who wishes to contextualise law‟s history.138 The results of such 
research, conducted within a contextual approach to historical reconstruction of lived 
experience, when viewed through the reversed telescope of the Academy, can thus 
appear as a separate and lesser rather than companion skill. Yet, legal history can, of 
course, be written without using „legal‟ records at all. An outstanding exemplar, 
particularly for socio-legal historians, is Reid‟s ground breaking and extremely influential 
(at least in the USA), Law For the Elephant.139 Using the private diaries and documents 
produced by travellers along the overland trail during the California gold rush from the 
late 1840s to the mid 1860s, Reid has constructed a picture of how those travellers 
perceived contractual, partnership and other legal relationships within their 
contemporary historical context. However, he does not lose sight of the lived experience 
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of those individuals whilst applying his technical legal skills; moreover, his work 
demonstrates how legal culture determines the personal behaviour and social conduct 
of ordinary people not trained in law. Reid‟s is a very unusual example of „quasi internal‟ 
legal history thoroughly contextualised as socio-legal history within the lived experience 
of those: „seeing the elephant‟. More usually, legal history emphasises legal skills 
rather than the methodologies of research historians and socio-legal scholars. Those 
legal skills comprise the ability to read law Latin, law French, interpret writs, and 
embrace the traditional black letter legal mindset. Such skills are laudable, difficult to 
acquire and, of necessity, create obstacles restricting entry to the upper echelons of 
this sub discipline.  
 
Unsurprisingly therefore, the majority of papers presented at the bi-annual British 
Legal History Conference lack any appreciation of, and hence citations to, the main 
achievements of socio-legal studies, including historical contextualistions of many of 
the topics and themes of that movement.140 Many of these papers remain rooted in 
the largely positivistic and black letter „old school‟ approach to law as a more or less 
closed system of rules, principles, axioms and formal procedures, such as the writ 
system, whose exposition remains largely internal to the reasoning, culture and 
actions of lawyers.141 Such a black letter approach epitomises decontextualisation. 142 
One American socio-legal scholar has, however, turned this approach on its head to 
consider how: „the despised legalisms of lawyers‟ may be perceived as an 
individual‟s protection against arbitrariness.‟143 Indeed, there is a danger that the 
above comments may be taken too seriously; such criticisms require nuancing. Over 
many years there have been contextual studies presented at the Conference and 
others published in Legal History.144 Professional historians working within „legal‟ and 
other sources attend the conference regularly and present thought- provoking 
papers. The current editorial board of Legal History consists of a broader, although 
still exclusively male, membership than in the past, including Cocks and Lobban. 
There are signs of a more sympathetic view towards interdisciplinary reconstructions 
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of law‟s past. However, the weight of the sub discipline‟s past historiography and the 
unwillingness of some to relinquish hold of Maitland‟s transcription project as a 
primary goal, leaves these „gentlemen and scholars in white cotton gloves‟ chasing a 
chimera.145   
 
In summary, in spite of positive indications, much work within this tradition is still 
resolutely opposed to the main tenets of the socio-legal movement discussed above. 
There is, for example, a widespread rejection of the idea that: „the task of historians 
is to provide the raw material for sociological theories, or simply to test such 
theories.‟146 In short, the intellectual pedigree of traditional legal history remains 
closer to that of black letter conceptions of the nature, scope and role of doctrinal 
legal analysis, than historical contextualisation. This has resulted in the past in the 
suggestion to writers of contextual historical reconstructions of law in action to: „send 
the work to a history journal‟. One pre-eminent practitioner of the genre, Ibbetson, 
differentiates between what he characterises as „internal‟ and „external‟ forms of legal 
history, with the latter contextualised within its wider historical past. With admirable 
clarity at least, he sums up this policy of how those committed to strictly „internal‟ 
forms of analysis typically seek to exclude so-called „external history‟, including 
various institutional dimensions:  
I should begin by drawing the more or less conventional division 
between external legal history and internal legal history. External legal 
history is the history of law as embedded in its context, typically its 
social or economic context … insofar as it might be said to be the 
history of law in action, it is the action that matters. It is the way that 
law operates in society, which seems to have law as the given and its 
operation as the thing that needs to be examined … by no stretch of 
the imagination could we say that any of these constituted parts of the 
history of law. So far as external legal history is concerned, we could 
almost say that the one thing that it is not a history of is law.147 
 
This passage represents more than a simple labelling exercise, it represents the 
fundamental purpose of those who practice the Academy‟s legal history. What is 
rejected as „external‟ histories by proponents of strictly „internal‟ histories are those 
contextualistions, exemplified in the works of Hurst and Friedman, in which the social 
function of law is revealed as central to any understanding of how legal institutions 
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operate and are shaped by general and specific goals, ideas and events.148  
More worryingly for this socio-legal historian, another generally excluded type of legal 
contextualisation is one that analyses the operation of law in the light of actual events 
taking place within its fields of application, even major disasters such as plagues, 
famine, war, and general social unrest, and their impact upon both the creation and 
application of legal measures.149 However, as noted earlier, there are signs that 
contextual work is beginning to be recognised as part of the sub discipline and socio-
legal and other researchers should take note. In spite of this, there is still a 
perception that the Academy‟s preference is solely for historical reconstruction that 
focuses on law as an intellectually autonomous professional culture. In short that the 
Academy only treats this topic „on its own terms‟ addressing sources thrown up 
mainly by the legal process itself, that is: „law that would have been recognised by 
lawyers in its time‟.150  
 
Equally on the negative side, in the past those who helped create socio-legal forms 
of historical contextualisation within the fields of private law found their contributions 
subjected to strong critiques by leading figures within the traditionalist internal school. 
For example, Atiyah‟s groundbreaking Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 151 
provoked a severe critique from Baker.152 This work has, however, been applauded 
by others.153 Such contextualisation, which violates the principle of exclusion, 
generates controversy precisely because it represents a contribution to socio-legal 
studies. Insofar as members of the black letter tradition even discuss contextual 
writers, such as Weber‟s sociology of law, they typically criticise their „neglect‟ of the 
protocols of formal legal argument.154 Furthermore, the claims of one member of this 
tradition that, in order to understand medieval legal devices one has to have already 
acquired a social theory of feudalism, has rarely been taken up and followed by other 
subscribers to traditional legal history.155 It is significant, that the irony if not absurdity 
of Ibbetson‟s position is, that contextualisation was recognised as vital by those early 
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pioneers of legal history whose traditions are still revered, if not followed, by current 
membership of the Academy.156  
 
A further paradox is that such rejection of external or contextual historical 
reconstructions is typically predicated upon a commitment to a sharp dichotomy 
between law and politics, the latter being one element of law‟s „external‟ context 
which must not be addressed. In this context, Hutchinson comments on the: 
„cramping and pervasive spirit of a black-letter mentality that encourages scholars 
and jurists to maintain legal study as an inward-looking and self-contained discipline‟. 
He continues:  
the textual formulation of the law is regnant and is treated as a law 
unto itself‟157 … In short, black-letterism works as a convenient mode 
of denial. It enables legal academics and lawyers to engage in what is 
a highly political and contested arena of social life – namely, law – and 
to pretend they are doing so on a largely non-political way.158  
 
Equally as critical, Smith and McLaren note that examples of contextual history need 
to be excluded precisely because they reveal the political nature of how this very 
dichotomy tends to operate in practice:  
that history demonstrates the inherently political nature of law and 
legal institutions; that the legal profession has sought to maintain a 
clear distinction between law and politics in order to present law as 
neutral and non-political; and that historical analysis reveals the 
ideological nature of successive structures of dominant legal thought 
employed by lawyers to ensure this apparent separation of law and 
politics.159  
 
However, some twenty years on from Friedman, there is a sense that finally things 
may be beginning to change, in line with the preface to his work. Then, he was 
deliberately provocative to the central tenets of internal legal histories, asserting:  
this book treats American law then, not as a kingdom unto itself, not 
as a set of rules and concepts, not as the province of lawyers alone, 
but as a mirror of society. It takes nothing as a historical accident, 
nothing as autonomous, everything as relative and moulded by 
economy and society.160  
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Thus, those IALS socio-legal conferences mentioned above constitute one positive 
sign. In addition, there is evidence that writers within mainstream legal history have 
become more receptive to the need for their supplementation by the type of external 
contextual historical reconstruction that form a key element of socio-legal studies. For 
example, Getzler‟s, History of Water Rights at Common Law combines doctrinal 
black letter scholarship contextualised within both the contexts of both economic 
analysis and industrial history.161 In addition, in a recent work Lobban, develops a 
cautious, if somewhat „coded‟, critique of the purported self-sufficiency of traditional 
internal legal history: 
The legal historian who focuses only upon the superior courts may be 
led to assume that the rules emanating from these courts were the 
most important manifestation of law in the society, since they had the 
highest status, or the finest pedigree. But their wider importance 
cannot simply be presumed. These concerns which seek to place an 
„external‟ history alongside the „internal‟ history of the law are 
particularly pressing for the legal historian of the early modern era.162   
 
Lobban‟s introductory editorial review of Schneider‟s study of Victorian perjury law 
further develops and illustrates this critique by endorsing what is effectively a socio-
legal view position, that legal materials remain unintelligible when interpreted in a 
non-contextual manner which excludes their social, political and policy dimension; 
concluding: „It is only with the aid of the „external‟ perspective that we can make 
sense of the „internal‟ developments.‟163 In other words, there is a pressing need to 
open the closed doors and windows of this particular palace, to let in sufficient light 
from the world outside to illuminate what has actually taken place within and its 
implications for non-lawyers. However, Lobban does not follow through the clear 
implications of this position by claiming that the writers of mainstream legal history, 
which his co-edited collection has selected for publication, lack intelligibility. 
 
This writer would endorse a wider and more radical view of the centrality of 
contextualisation, which recognises that even those materials which mainstream 
legal history recognises as „law‟ cannot be understood unless the their social and 
other impact is also grasped. Contextualisation of these dimensions of law also 
requires contextualisation of the impact of law upon society, and its pervasiveness as 
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a social phenomenon. Unfortunately, few, if any, of the leading writers of legal history 
attend, or otherwise contribute to, socio-legal conferences, or publish their work 
within associated publications. Hence, as discussed above, whilst socio-legal and 
other contextual law journals have published a considerable number of both implicitly 
and explicitly historical studies of law in action, few if any of the establishment legal 
historians have published their research in these outlets. Instead, their attachment to 
the orthodox positivist project means that they find publishing in more mainstream 
and conservative journals, such as The Law Quarterly Review and Cambridge Law 
Journal, far more attractive than distinctly socio-legal outlets. This, combined with 
their preference for internal histories, emphasises that this genre is far more closely 
aligned with conventional legal scholarship than with either history or socio-legal 
studies. 
 
This issue of publishing is perhaps the most problematic barrier to a potential rapport 
between socio-legal scholars and the sub discipline of legal history. But, as noted 
above, there are signs of a subtle change. This in spite of the fact that, from its 
earliest manifestation in the nineteenth century at Cambridge University, the 
exponents of legal history have developed their own niche outlets for publication and 
designated routes for appointment and promotion within the heart of the Academy. 
To establish this, this writer has looked closely through the journals where socio-legal 
historical reconstructions have found a receptive home. Rarely do the six 
„establishment‟ legal history journals appear.164 The exception is the American Law 
and History Review, which publishes a wide spread of legal history, ranging from 
medieval studies to socio-legal and comparative legal history. It also includes a 
„comments‟ section, which sometimes engages in debate concerning historical topics 
of interest to socio-legal scholarship.  
 
Thus, with ready-made publishing outlets, there appears little material impetus for 
legal historians of the traditional kind to enter into, and contribute to, the socio-legal 
movement. Nor would the predominantly medieval and Roman law oriented themes 
of legal history offer much inspiration to members of the socio-legal movement, 
particularly the majority who firmly reject supposedly strictly „internal‟ analysis of legal 
doctrine and procedures. It is not surprising, therefore, that this rather self-referential 
and relatively closed branch of traditional legal scholarship has failed to attract 
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widespread admiration from, or gained noticeable influence within, socio-legal circles. 
Perhaps more serious for the survival of this sub discipline, is its failure to recruit a 
significant following amongst young scholars to take the place of the current 
membership, many of whom will retire within the next decade. It is arguable that this 
form of historical reconstruction, rooted in the analytical framework of legal 
positivism, has become anachronistic in the wake of the rise of socio-legal studies 
and the social history of law. Furthermore, its very survival within the legal academy 
has almost become an historical curiosity in its own right.  
 
More positively however, there are a number of signs that research focussed upon 
historical reconstructions of „law in context‟ are experiencing a renewal in other areas 
of legal scholarship. Thus providing further evidence that the existing insulation of 
legal history from the interdisciplinary methodologies characteristic of socio-legal 
studies is beginning to break down, at least at the margins. Certainly in recent years, 
some researchers have developed a number of different approaches that transcend 
the traditional agenda by formulating research agendas that are distinctly 
contextual.165 The beginnings of a new movement for a more distinctly historical, 
comparatively „deviant‟, and thus controversial, type of historical contextualisation 
can be discerned. Thus, legal historians, both drawn from law, criminal justice and 
history, are increasingly writing on many aspects of life in the past, ranging from the 
lives of women written from a feminist perspective, to law and literature. More 
significantly, SOLON, the Inter-Institutional-Museum of Law Partnership Promoting 
Interdisciplinary Studies in Bad Behaviour and Socially Visible Crime, holds an 
annual conference around the theme of „behaving badly‟, in 2007, this will take place 
in collaboration with the IALS and CCBH and IHR. In addition, SOLON is responsible 
for the publication of the journal in which this position paper appears.166 This group 
has published themed collections of articles and the conference has created an 
environment where legal scholars, criminal justice researchers and professional 
historians meet to develop truly interdisciplinary and contextual historical 
reconstructions. 
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Conclusion 
 
This writer was partly inspired to write this piece by an impression that legal history 
appeared to have little place in the „law in context‟ concerns of the socio-legal 
movement. In addition, her initial perception of the sub discipline of legal history were 
that its black letter concerns, antiquarian interests and concentration upon „internal‟ 
histories generally, and its specific rejection of interdisciplinary scholarship, 
precluded the history of law being assimilated within the socio-legal canon. However, 
this writer has noted growing evidence of support for the historical socio-legal project 
at both conferences and in publications, initially in the USA, more recently in the UK. 
Significantly, from the earliest days of the socio-legal movement there is also 
evidence of a considerable engagement with an historical contextualisation of law‟s 
past. This article has, moreover, argued that some areas of socio-legal enquiry, 
particularly that of law reform, cannot be undertaken by excluding reconstructions of 
the past that „required‟ reform.  
 
In summary, there have been a number of publications within the genre that are 
specifically intended as historical reconstructions of the emergence and 
transformation of law in action. However, an SLSA version of „legal history‟, insofar 
as one can be identified, has more usually taken the form of a methodology for 
social-legal research embedded within the larger concerns of specific research 
questions. An historical perspective can be adopted, for example, to illuminate the 
development and changes in legal institutions over time, or to reconstruct the 
relationship between legal change and developing, stultifying or collapsing social 
structures. As such, even if remaining secondary to the main research purposes, 
historical contextualisation performs a valuable service to the socio-legal project and, 
perhaps, deserves more recognition and critical discussion than it has received to 
date. More damningly for such an argument, Reid has considered that, within the 
North American experience, their concentration upon methodology has: „distracted us 
from the narrative component of legal history‟.167  However, a closer examination of 
the current place of historical reconstruction in laws‟ history in the UK reveals a more 
positive picture. Recent developments within the sub discipline of legal history seem 
to indicate that the resistance to contextualisation is beginning to weaken at the 
margins. Equally, there is a great deal more interest in historical reconstruction within 
the socio-legal movement than is apparent at first glance. In this context, this writer 
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would suggest that it is time for all legal scholars involved in the project of historical 
reconstruction to acknowledge the common elements and openly debate the 
differences. 
 
More personally, this writer, in using archival records, literature and legal and other 
primary sources for historical reconstructions, must acknowledge that the work by 
scholars from other disciplines has enriched her projects. This has led to her arriving 
at a number of conclusions drawn from her own and fellow researchers‟ experience.  
The first is that scholars are precluded from formulating an even-handed assessment 
by being unaware of research being produced from within other academic disciplines. 
This has resulted in the neglect of important source materials that, to some extent at 
least, other strands of scholarship have succeeded in uncovering. Acknowledgement 
of this truth would have the much-needed impact of counter-balancing the one-sided 
quality of the majority of prevailing discussions within certain branches of historical 
reconstruction. For example, studies of post World War II war crimes prosecutions 
have largely concentrated upon the major trials of the International Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg, and that largely but not exclusively from either a lawyer or historian‟s 
perspective.168 Thus, by returning to the work of, amongst others, archival, military, 
intelligence and cold war historians, and revisiting research produced from within 
Holocaust studies, this writer has begun a socio-legal project on the under-
researched Allied „minor‟ war crimes trials; using archival and legal sources to 
reconstruct the lived experiences of all those involved from investigation to trial: 
including lawyers, serving soldiers, intelligence officials, victims and accused.169 The 
second point follows logically; that, in some areas of historical reconstruction, 
contextualising law and its pervasiveness with the lived experience creates a new 
sub genre of that discipline; or alternatively that some research requires such a level 
of interdisciplinarity that it in itself creates a sub discipline, combining research in law 
and history fully. Such a programme makes it possible to identify clusters of research 
projects where interdisciplinary research has the potential to reveal groundbreaking 
new material. Finally, as an alternative position, it could be that all these points in 
total indicate that legal history, comprising legal history and historical reconstructions 
in the broadest sense produced in and around a legal context, constitutes a discrete 
discipline in its own right. 
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If any of these perspectives are adopted, singly or together, the results could 
contribute to the „transcendence from within‟ of self-imposed disciplinary boundaries 
that currently restrict the vision and possibilities of both legal and socio-legal 
historical reconstructions. They, in turn, could allow for the fruitful expansion of the 
breadth of vision for many disciplines through both a process of cross-fertilisation of 
existing research findings and by encouraging new empirical research projects 
precisely in those „overlapping‟ topics that mainstream contributors to these 
disciplines might not otherwise envisage on the grounds that they are „too legal‟.170 
Such interdisciplinarity hybridises and supplements aspects of all „legal‟ research that 
gives equal weight to all sides of this evolving collaborative process. As such, this 
writer believes that it should be of great interest and value to those engaged in the 
socio-legal movement. Moreover, such hybridisations will not be sterile; to be 
precise, they could at the least initiate a new perspective upon the role of historical 
reconstructions within socio-legal studies and relocate them as a sub-
genre/discipline, perhaps even a discrete discipline. In short, this writer hopes that 
those reconstructions could be pursued in their own right, transcending the 
methodological purposes to which they have so often been confined.  
 
To this end, Cannadine suggests that the purpose of history is not merely a search 
for causation but also a: „search for meaning‟.171 One way this could be achieved 
within legal studies is via a rapprochement between the socio-legal movement and 
traditional legal history. Another is, that those engaged in socio-legal historical 
reconstructions finally acknowledge what has become evident to this writer through 
this empirical study of their work. That is, those reconstructions are central to their 
larger project of demonstrating the pervasiveness of the lived experience of law. As 
such it would be timely for a much wider discussion on the nature and methodology 
of those studies than has been seen to date. 
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